Section 2: Understanding “Social Capital” – What are the different forms of “social capital”? How are cultural variations between communities illuminated through the study of social capital? Analyzing the role of religious institutions and traditions as a function of community-level social capital. “Cultural competence” and the ethics of “disaster recovery as development.”

Key concepts and topics:

  • What is “social capital”?
  • Linking Social Capital
  • Bonding Social Capital
  • Bridging Social Capital
  • How do comparative studies of different communities help us to better understand “social capital’?
  • The relationship between religious institutions and community-level social capital
  • What is “cultural competence”?
  • What are some ethical issues that arise in the discussion/investigation of “disaster recovery as development”?

Part 1: Outline of the section with background information, bibliographic resources for the instructors preparation and learning objectives

  • Background information:

This section relies heavily on the following article:

Nakagawa, Y., & Shaw, R. (2004). Social capital: A missing link to disaster recovery. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters22(1), 5-34.

This article is referenced and cited repeatedly throughout the section, and should be assigned to students at some point while working through this section of the module – ideally prior to them working through this section.

As you can recall from section 1, sustainable disaster recovery means, “building back better” for communities; or, that communities go beyond a return to the pre-disaster status quo following a disaster.Again, disaster recover is multi-faceted and sustainable community-level disaster recovery is evidenced by building stronger infrastructure, strengthening social bonds, bolstering economic activity, and introducing and implementing risk reduction measures for future disasters within the community in question. “Disaster recovery is not only about building houses but the reconstruction of the whole community as a safer place. To mobilize each member of the community in this collective action (community development), social capital is a crucial need.” (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; 12)

“In the context of sustainable disaster recovery, returning to the way things were before the disaster is not always the best approach. Disaster recovery presents a significant, albeit limited, window of opportunity to rebuild damaged structures stronger than before the event, alter land-use patterns, and reshape the existing social, political, and economic landscapes.” (Smith and Wenger 2007; 240). Characteristics of successful local recovery plans include: community involvement in the decision making processes following disasters, the production and dissemination of accurate scientific information regarding vulnerability and risks to the community, putting procedures in place for future disasters, and coordinated damage evaluation (Smith and Wenger 2007).

Defining “social capital”:As stated in section 1, “social capital” is a major function of how a community prepares for (or does not), experiences, and recovers from disasters. This section of the learning module focuses on the role of various forms of social capital in the recovery of the two communities identified in section 1 of the module.  As stated in section 1: “social capital” is those social networks and positions that yield various benefits for their members; social capital is all about connections.

“Post-disaster recovery processes should be considered as opportunities for development, by revitalizing the local economy and upgrading livelihoods and living conditions. Social capital, which is defined as a function of trust, social norms, participation, and network, can play an important role in recovery” (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; 5).

“Social capital, in general, refers to the trust, social norms, and net-works which affect social and economic activities…. Level(s) of trust, social norms and networks can be measured and a high accumulation of such capital contributes significantly to social, political and even economic performance, for better or worse. The term “social capital” has become quite popular both in the field of social science disciplines and in inter-national development.” (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; 7)

So, “trust” is an important function of social capital. For example:

  • Do neighbors trust each other?
  • Do communities trust their local and national government entities?
  • Do communities trust local economic leaders?

Additionally, inherent to this concept is also the idea of “reciprocity” – the sharing between groups and peoples. This section of the learning module illustrates that economic reciprocity works differently in these two communities, contributing to comparatively disparate recovery outcomes.

There are three main forms of social capital: (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; Aldrich 2012)

  1. Bonding social capital: those connections between families and neighbors, and close social ties, along with demographic characteristics that bind people together.
  • Community participation in the relief and recovery efforts post-disaster is crucial to this element of enacting bonding social capital. (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004)
  1. Bridging social capital: the ties between different groups of people, which cross economic and political divisions.
  • This includes links between various stakeholders such as “town-planning consultants, academicians, other community activity groups, other neighbors associations, etc.” (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; 10)
  1. Linking social capital: ties between community members, business leaders, and political leaders including “formal collaboration: interaction with government officials through community development activities (Nakagawa and Shaw; 19)

The questions that are addressed, in regards to the social capital, in the communities in Kallady and Kattankudy are as follows:

  • Bonding social capital: How do community members in majority Hindu versus Muslim communities negotiate their familial and neighborly social ties within the context of recovery from a natural disaster and civil war?
  • Bridging social capital: In what ways do local groups negotiate economic and political boundaries and coalitions as they recover in the context of a civil war?
  • Linking social capital: How do community members negotiate relations with business and political leaders in order to recover in the context of a complex humanitarian emergency?

By comparing the answers to these questions between the two communities, we are able to better understand the ways that social capital interacts with the disaster process.

With regards to the interaction between the 2004 tsunami and the Sri Lankan civil war, it is especially important to note that “social capital” can be considered “janus-faced.” Meaning that “negative social capital, such as situations in which closely knit groups use their solidarity to exclude others or exert so much influence on members that they drain their resources or pressure members towards conformity. Gangs, factions engaged in civil wars, and racist groups rank high on social capital, but that it not considered a good thing… (the) Janus-faced nature of social capital (shows)… that strong in-group solidarity can result in the exclusion of out-group members and even violent social conflicts.” (Tierney 2014; 195)

How do comparative studies of different communities help us to better understand “social capital”?:With respect to social capital, Aldrich (2012) found that bonding social capital, or the ability to negotiate familial and social ties within a community, was important in caste- based communities in Tamil Nadu, India after the 2004 tsunami, but the situation of Sri Lanka is less straightforward. Although the caste system still exists in Sri Lanka, it is moresubmerged than in India, and is not a salient feature of all communities across the island. A strong caste-based identity enabled Indian communities to seek out and share the limited resources coming into their villages, whereas in some communities in Sri Lanka, bonding social capital was weakened by cleavages caused by the civil war. It was not uncommon for neighbors in Sri Lanka, including family members living near one another, to be split on issues of war, especially in the Tamil/Hindu communities that the LTTE occupied (even intermittently). The caste system is not practiced in Muslim communities and as such, community organization is less fractured along lines of social class than in the Tamil/Hindu communities.

Where bonding social capital focuses on the inter-community social ties, bridging social capital involves the ability of communities to connect with external resources. In these two communities, it is apparent that the religion of village leaders played an important role in their ability to negotiate for relief and recovery aid from the Sinhala government, foreign and local NGOs, and the LTTE, which played a major role in the relief and recovery of the northern and eastern regions of the island.

Pre-existing levels of wealth—or, more specifically, the nature of that wealth—may be another key to the inconsistency in recovery outcomes. While both communities were economically productive prior to the tsunami — the community in Kallady was an economically successful fishing village and the one in Kattankudy was an economically successful village of locally-owned and -operated small businesses—the discussion of their pre-tsunami economic conditions cannot be limited to a simple description of the types of industries they engage in and whether or not those industries recovered. While it is true that these occupational differences influenced communities’ capacities to call upon material wealth in the aftermath of the tsunami, it is also the case that these communities had different mechanisms in place to allow them to call upon material wealth in the aftermath of the tsunami. This section of the learning module focuses specifically on the religious institutions embedded within each community that influenced their ability to call upon this material wealth.

The relationship between religious institutions and community level-social capital in Sri Lanka’s east coast following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami – looking specifically at “linking social capital”:There were savings mechanisms present in Kattankudy’s economic and religio-political structure that influenced its ability to utilize existing wealth for tsunami-relief and –recovery related projects (Jayasuriya et al. 2006). This includes the “Zakat” – one of the five basic tenants of Islam.

What is “Zakat”?
“According to the Holy Qur’an, God owns all wealth, and private property is seen as a trust from God. Property has a social function in Islam, and must be used for the benefit of society. Moreover, there is divine duty to work. Social justice is the result of organizing society on Islamic social and legal precepts, including employment of productive labor and equal opportunities, such that everyone can use all of their abilities in work and gain just rewards from that work effort. Justice and equality in Islam means that people should have equal opportunity and does not imply that they should be equal either in poverty or riches (Chapra 1985). However, it is incumbent on the Islamic state to guarantee a subsistence level to its citizens, in the form of a minimal level of food, clothing, shelter, medical care and education (Holy Qur’an 58: 11). The major purpose here is to moderate social variances in Islamic society, and to enable the poor to lead a normal, spiritual and material life in dignity and contentment.

A mechanism for the redistribution of income and wealth is inherent in Islam, so that every Muslim is guaranteed a fair standard of living, nisab. Zakat is the most important instrument for the redistribution of wealth. This almsgiving is a compulsory levy… The generally accepted amount of the zakat is a one-fourtieth (2.5 per cent) assessment on assets held for a full year… the purpose of which is to transfer income from the wealthy to the needy…” (40-41)

Hassan, K., & Lewis, M. (Eds.). (2009). Handbook of Islamic banking. Edward Elgar Publishing.

While there are different forms of Islam practiced in Kattankudy villages, Kattankudy’s Mosque Federation had a fund of Zakat money that was available to mobilize immediately following the tsunami to help with both short- and long-term relief and recovery efforts, in addition to the government and non-governmental resources available. However, these same mechanisms were not present in the village in Kallady. The village in Kallady is a mixed-religious community, though the majority of residents are Hindu. There are no similar mechanisms to the Zakat present in the Hindu or Christian communities embedded within the Kallady community. As such, while considering the economic aspects of “linking social capital,” the Muslim community in Kattankudy was much more-well equipped, in comparison to the community in Kallady, to mobilize economic resources to envision and execute a “successful” recovery strategies.

To illustrate this, we can compare some relevant recovery outcomes in both communities, and investigate the ways in which they engaged with their linking social capital –

Relevant Recovery Outcomes:

  • Community in Kallady:
    • Many unfinished houses from a multitude of I/NGO (International Non-Governmental Organization) projects; no new infrastructure projects that serve the whole-community
    • Multi-actor uncoordinated efforts: there were at least 9 I/NGO’s that proceeded with house re-building projects in this village and none of them communicated with each other to coordinate their efforts in order to provide equitable aid to families
    • There was, and remains, significant divisions between community members along lines of clan/family and religious groups. While these divisions may not necessarily be antagonistic, the division contributes to a lack of social cohesion within the community at-large
    • A significant proportion of community members have been relocated/displaced to other areas in a deliberate post-tsunami project.
    • No long-term livelihood recovery for fisher folk
  • Community in Kattankudy:
    • No unfinished houses from only two I/NGO projects; New infrastructure projects including a divisional hospital and schools
    • Strong coordination between limited groups
    • Community cohesion across geographic, business, and private sectors
    • Very few community members have left Kattankudy as a result of the tsunami, and only a very few were officially relocated
    • Long-term livelihood strategies in place: business re-developed and successful micro-financing projects

Linking Social Capital:

  • Community in Kallady:
    • Political leadersdid not communicate effectively across sectors or with I/NGOs
      • High rate of GN Person turnover: between 2004 and 2013 there were at least 4 different GN persons tasked with leading this community, as such – coordinated efforts across time were not enacted
      • No “higher up” advocate for the people this community – there was no one in the higher levels of government (beyond the GN person) who focused efforts on relief and recovery in this community
    • Local businessis primarily fishing, some private, and some government
      • Fisheries society, a prominent community-based organization pre-tsunami was largely ineffective post-tsunami due to the relocation of so many of the fisher folk to other areas of Batticaloa
      • Economic reciprocity is ineffective at stimulating community-level economic growth
    • Community divisions created a context of non-cooperation between government leaders and I/NGO’s and among community members
  • Community in Kattankudy:
    • Political leaderscommunicated effectively and with authority across sectors and with I/NGOs
      • Same GN person from 2003-2014 who won an award for his service in effectively coordinating relief and recovery efforts in the community
      • Prominent Muslim member of parliament as an advocate for community
      • Essentially, two “governments” – the secular government (including the GN person) and the Mosque Federation coordinated to advocate for this community, and communicated with community members to effectively enact relief and recovery programs
    • Local businessis primarily private businesses, some fishing, some government
      • Business coalitions largely effective in negotiating on their own behalf
      • The community safety-net of zakat (economic reciprocity within the community)
    • Community cohesion led to practices whereby there were strong cooperation between parties at multiple levels of the power structure and among community members

As illustrated above, the political leadership of the communities is vastly different. Where the community in Kattankudy has essentially two trusted leadership groups (the traditional government, and the Mosque Federation), the community in Kallady has had very little consistency in leadership since 2004. All of this means that the community members either did (in Kattankudy) or did not (in Kallady) trust their leaders to advocate for them, and were or were not empowered to speak up for both what they needed, and what they may have seen as something going wrong with a relief or recovery project .

I argue that economic reciprocity mediated by the Mosque Federation in Muslim communities (zakat) tended to benefit the community at-large, allowing for a more holistic community recovery. Whereas in the mixed-religious community in Kallady, economic reciprocity is not mediated by a formal institution, and is mostly confined to matri-local clan based groups creating more fracture in the community leading to uneven recovery within the community.

Social capital is both structural (re: the presence of institutions available to assist in relief and recovery efforts) and cultural (religious norms, in this example). Thus, we cannot understand the power of linking social capital without understanding the religious context within which social structures are embedded. The experience of ethno-religious tensions brought on by the war in the community in Kallady led to social divisions within the community and the tendency for social groups within the community to become more inwardly focused: people became focused on family/clan groups rather than the community at-large. However, in Kattankudy, though there are divisions in the types of Islam that is practiced within the community, the nature of religious cohesion due to one hundred percent of community members identifying with Islam (in some form) created a cohesion that allowed for stronger forms of social welfare between community members and neighbors across familial ties.

“Cultural competence”:Cultural competence is an important element of international relief- and recovery-aid delivery. Following the 2004 tsunami, a great many international players came into Sri Lanka (and other nations) to help the affected communities, and sometimes they were more or less culturally competent. What is meant by “cultural competence” in this section is the extent to which those helping/assisting communities to recover from a disaster understand and account for the cultures in which they are working. For instance, it is very important to for aid workers to know the norms surrounding the ways in which various households of different religious and ethnic backgrounds go about decision making practices. Additionally, and more specific to the cases at hand in this learning module – it would be important for international aid workers to know how matrilineal and matrilocal clan-based communities go about dividing land for family members, and building homes which includes a deep understanding of local kinship customs surrounding marriage and dowry. In order to engage with the communities in which they are working, with a strong level of cultural competence, it is important for foreign entities to meet with, hear from, and work with local people to get the relief and recovery projects up and running. What follows are a couple of examples in which cultural competence was and was not engaged in the relief and recovery efforts in the communities in Kallady and Kattankudy.

Kallady: There were at least ten unique housing development projects implemented in this community. Each of these projects was done by a different organization, and very rarely – if ever – did the organizations work with each other to make sure that they were providing equitable aid to community members. Additionally, during my field research, I found that only a small few of these organizations consulted with households and family members to see what the community members really wanted when it came to building and/or rebuilding their homes. In some cases, I found that although there was a female head of house (ie: a female home-owner and land-holder), the women in the community were excluded from conversations about construction of new homes based on the wrong and sexist assumption that women did not know anything about the construction of homes. As such, men would be sought out as local overseers of the projects, the men in the households would be put in charge of the paperwork and financial transactions associated with rebuilding, and even in some cases, new house deeds were put into a man’s name where the pre-tsunami home was in the name of his wife, sister, mother, daughter, etc. Finally, there were religious considerations that could have been accounted for in the building of homes that may have reduced the need for a duplication of efforts. For example, in Hindu households, it is not preferable to have the kitchen, or any space where food is handled, near to a bathroom or toilet facility. However, because community members were rarely consulted in the construction of their new homes, INGO’s would – as a cost saving measure – centralize plumbing in homes which made it so that the kitchen and toilets were very close, often sharing a wall. In some cases, folks living in these houses would fill the new toilet facilities with sand, and install a puja (prayer) room or use the space for storage. And in these cases, these households were then left without a toilet meaning that another organization would need to come in and build more culturally appropriate toilet facilities for the families.

Kattankudy: As outlined previously in this section, the community in Kattankudy had strong levels of linking social capital, and strong local (community) leaders who acted as advocates on behalf of their fellow community members. It is because of this strong social capital and strong local leadership, I believe, that this community has experienced successful infrastructure recovery. In the vein of cultural competence, this meant that foreign and local organizations that came into Kattankudy could not start projects without first consulting with various local leaders, including members of the Mosque Federation. Because members of the community were consulted in the process of planning for infrastructure recovery, the post-tsunami homes built in this village in Kattankudy were culturally appropriate. Additionally, because the local leadership was so well-organized, rather than ten or more organizations coming in to build homes, there were only two distinct housing projects in this village, and those projects were led by organizations that consulted not only with each other, but with community members in the processes of both planning and building. Because of this, there is a sense of equity present in this village, that is not present in the village in Kallady – where even something as straightforward as the size of houses allocated to different families was not considered. In Kattankudy, I have found not only that community members are happy with their new homes, and feel as if they had a stake in the building of the homes, but they are also happy to report that their shops and schools have been rebuilt, and there is a new hospital in the village. I found no instances whereby households are unhappy with the houses that they received, and much of this had to do – I believe – because community members’ input was gathered throughout the rebuilding process.

Ethical issues with the “disaster recovery as development paradigm”:If Sri Lanka is to be considered a nation that is in the process of “developing,” it is important to investigate the roots of the international “development” paradigm, and to look at the ways in which disasters (both natural and man-made) may disrupt and/or contribute to the development of communities. In an introduction to an edited book by Mark Pelling, called “Natural Disaster and Development in a Globalizing World,” (2003) Dr. Pelling offers a brief definition of “development” in relation to disasters:

“A recent definition of development presents it as ‘an economic, social, and political process, which results in a cumulative rise in the perceived standard of living for an increasing proportion of the population. But this supposes a benign physical environment, allowing a cumulative rise in the standards of living. Hewitt’s argument that ‘if there could be such a thing as sustainable development, disasters would represent a major thread to it, or a sign of its failure’ highlights the ability of natural disasters to set back development.” (Pelling 2003; 4)

If we accept Pelling’s supposition that development includes a rise in the objective and subjective experiences of “standard of living” in various communities, and that we cannot assume a benign physical environment – it is a logical next step to understand that disasters can and do play a large role in the “development” of communities. One major disaster can be a setback to healthy economic growth for years” (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; 6). However, “development” can take many forms, and many foreign entities that enter communities to provide post-disaster aid may not have those communities’ best interests in mind while implementing their projects that are imbued with a “development” ethos.

Disasters affect communities in a variety of ways, which is why we must look at “recovery” from disasters from an equally dynamic perspective. By incorporating social, economic, infrastructural, and risk reduction measures into recovery plans and operations, we may approach “recovery” from a holistic sense. And, as evidenced with in the previous section on cultural competence, it is not without the help and input of local people that this can be achieved. Only very rarely were community members in Kallady asked what they wanted and needed in the process of their community being rebuilt for themwhereas in Kattankudy, we see a community being rebuilt with community members. This is a massive piece to the international development puzzle – how do we ensure that “development” in a community is actually going to be something that empowers a community rather something that contributes to its oppression? In the case of Kallady and Kattankudy, we see both failures and successes in the realm of “development” and this has clear ethical implications for disaster practitioners and researchers. Sustainable disaster recovery, as clearly outlined in Section 1 of this module, means that communities are able to “build back better” and experience higher capacity for their own self-sufficiency in a post-disaster setting. As such, when foreign entities enter into communities to “offer help,” that is exactly what they ought to do. Rather than imposing a foreign (often “Western” and/or “global North” slanted) view of what is good or bad for a community or what a community may want or need, it is important to ask the community what type of help they may want or need. The inclusion of community members in post-disaster decision making and rebuilding processes is an important step towards sustainable disaster recovery which may in fact lead to “developments” within communities that are both ethical and culturally competent. And, as is I hope already clear, the inclusion of women in these decision-making processes is a crucial step towards a sustainable development paradigm in any community.

If you would like a deeper-dive into the “development and disasters” literature, there is a short list of relevant references provided in part 7 of this section.

  • Bibliographic Resources:

Aldrich, D. P. (2012). Building resilience: Social capital in post-disaster recovery. University of Chicago Press.

Hassan, K., & Lewis, M. (Eds.). (2009). Handbook of Islamic banking. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Jayasuriya, S., Steele, P., &Weerakoon, D. (2006). Post-tsunami recovery: issues and challenges in Sri Lanka (No. 71). ADBI Research Paper Series.

Nakagawa, Y., & Shaw, R. (2004). Social capital: A missing link to disaster recovery. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters22(1), 5-34.

Pelling, M. (2003). Natural disaster and development in a globalizing world.Routledge.

Smith, G. P., & Wenger, D. (2007). Sustainable disaster recovery: Operationalizing an existing agenda. Handbook of disaster research, 234-257.

Tierney, K. (2014). The social roots of risk: Producing disasters, promoting resilience. Stanford University Press.

  • Learning Objectives (re: Bloom’s Taxonomy)


  • Evaluate:
    • Students should be able to critique an example of “disaster recovery” as culturally competent or not culturally competent

Part 2: Two peer-reviewed articles that may be used as background information for the instructor and/or as assigned reading for students

  1. See attached pdf: “Nakagawa and Shaw (2004)” Nakagawa, Y., & Shaw, R. (2004). Social capital: A missing link to disaster recovery. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters22(1), 5-34.
  2. See attached pdf: “Uyangoda (2005)” Uyangoda, J. (2005). Ethnic conflict, the Sri Lankan state and the tsunami. Forced Migration Review24, 30-31.

Part 3: PowerPoint slides covering the key concepts outlined in the section that may be used to a brief lecture and to facilitate classroom discussion

  • See attached:
  • Section 2_pt 3_Powerpoint.ppt, and
    • Thispowerpoint can be printed as slides for students as a handout, and includes notes for an instructor’s presentation. The included notes are the notes used in the recordings (Part 4)
  • Section 2_pt 3_Powerpoint.pdf
    • This is a .pdf file of just the slides.

Part 4: A video recording of the PowerPoint presentation (given in Part 4) that may be assigned to students for out-of-classroom viewing

  • See attached video recording: BITTEL_AISLS_CDG 2017_SECTION 2 VIDEO

Part 5: One assignment to address higher level learning objectives (application/creation) with a corresponding assessment rubric

Part 6: Links to relevant multi-media resources included in the section

  • N/A

Part 7: A brief list of resources for further investigation

  • Readings on “disaster and development” specifically”
    • Ahrens, J., & Rudolph, P. M. (2006). The importance of governance in risk reduction and disaster management. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management14(4), 207-220.
    • Anderson, M. B. (1985). A reconceptualization of the linkages between disasters and development. Disasters9(s1), 46-51.
    • Bankoff, G. (2001). Rendering the world unsafe:‘vulnerability’as western discourse. Disasters25(1), 19-35.
    • Bates, F. L., & Peacock, W. G. (2008). Living conditions, disasters and development: An approach to cross-cultural comparisons. University of Georgia Press.
    • De Silva, D. A. M., &Yamao, M. (2007). Effects of the tsunami on fisheries and coastal livelihood: a case study of tsunami‐ravaged southern Sri Lanka. Disasters31(4), 386-404.
    • Gaillard, J. C. (2010). Vulnerability, capacity and resilience: perspectives for climate and development policy. Journal of International Development22(2), 218-232.
    • Haque, C. E. (2003). Perspectives of natural disasters in East and South Asia, and the Pacific Island States: Socio-economic correlates and needs assessment. Natural hazards29(3), 465-483.
    • McEntire, D. A. (2004). Development, disasters and vulnerability: A discussion of divergent theories and the need for their integration. Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal13(3), 193-198.
    • Mercer, J., Dominey-Howes, D., Kelman, I., & Lloyd, K. (2007). The potential for combining indigenous and western knowledge in reducing vulnerability to environmental hazards in small island developing states. Environmental Hazards7(4), 245-256.
    • Pelling, M. (2003). Natural disaster and development in a globalizing world.Routledge.
    • Pelling, M., High, C., Dearing, J., & Smith, D. (2008). Shadow spaces for social learning: a relational understanding of adaptive capacity to climate change within organisations. Environment and Planning A40(4), 867-884.
    • Pelling, M., &Uitto, J. I. (2001). Small island developing states: natural disaster vulnerability and global change. Global Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards3(2), 49-62.
    • Schipper, L., &Pelling, M. (2006). Disaster risk, climate change and international development: scope for, and challenges to, integration. Disasters,30(1), 19-38.
    • Srinivas, H., & Nakagawa, Y. (2008). Environmental implications for disaster preparedness: lessons learnt from the Indian Ocean Tsunami. Journal of Environmental Management89(1), 4-13.
    • Wisner, B., & Walker, P. (2005). The world conference on disaster viewed through the lens of political ecology: A dozen big questions for Kobe and beyond. Capitalism Nature Socialism16(2), 89-95.